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KUHARA Fusinosuke

Extract from JIJI Release, 21 May 1948, Tokyo. (OSO Registry #44-7-0-29)

On 22 May 1948 the Purge Appeals Commission rejected the appeal of KUHARA Fusinosuke, a leader of the defunct Seiyukai Party.

Extract from Dispatch #ZJL-88, Tokyo, 13 August 1948 (From news article by Howard Handleman, INS correspondant)

There is evidence that Communist Party leaders at least have tried to effect liaison with some of Japan's most notorious rightists. KUHARA Fusinosuke, friend and financial supporter of right-wing military groups that forged Japan's foreign policy through violence and threat in the 30's, was approached by three top JCP leaders for an interview shortly after the Americans released him from Sugamo Prison where he had been held as a war criminal suspect.

KUHARA turned them down, saying "the time is not yet ripe", but later he told this correspondant that in the final showdown the leaders of the JCP would "act like Japanese first, then like Communists". The great bulk of the new ultra-nationalist societies are small groups of men who served together in the war.

Extract from CIS/FEC Special Report, THE BROCADE BANNER, THE STORY OF JAPANESE NATIONALISM by Tom Davis, 23 September 1946 (OSO Registry #44-7-8-1)

KUHARA speaking in February 1928: "The Cabinet's most important mission at this time is the solution of the Manchurian and Mongolian question. Now is the time to solve the question of Manchuria and Mongolia. In this lies my reason for having supported TANAKA all these years. I shall be able to do much if I become the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, because TANAKA is Foreign Minister as well as Premier. If necessary, I am willing even to become a consul general in Manchuria."

KUBOTA Kinshiro stated in his testimony at the time of the investigation of the 26 February 1936 Plot, that KUHARA was in favor of making Manchuria an unarmed free state, just as Korea should have been. Japanese control, he implies, would have been exercised through economic and other unofficial means.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Classified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
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KUHARA, Fusinosuke

Extract from Accession #ZJLA-111, Tokyo, 15 October 1948.

KUHARA Fusinosuke, former president of the Seiyukai. The present Finance Ministry is being criticized for not having blocked and impounded his property during the period November 1945 to September 1947 when he was being investigated for war crimes activities.

Extract from Dispatch #ZJLN-243, Tokyo, 14 December 1948. Info on KUHARA

From FBI dated 5 March 1947: Former president of the now defunct Seiyukai is planning to run for the lower house. KUHARA was recently informed that the investigation of his possibility of being a war criminal has been dropped, thus paving the way for the 78-year old politician to resume political activities.

From WD Target Folder XVIII, May 1945: Manchurian industrialist who would be familiar with Japanese expansionist circles, particularly the Kwantung Army. Mentioned in Folder as person to interrogate for political information.

From Pacific Affairs XVII, #3, September 1944: Army favorite. Has financed some of the Genyosha projects.

From a rpt dated 4/3/44 (information as of March 1938) evaluated B-3: Statesman. Industrialist. Member of Cabinet Advisory Council. Former President of the Seiyukai Party.

Born June 1869 in Yamaguchi-ken. Career: Graduate of Keio University in 1889. Joined Morimura & Co., * Fujita in 1915. Established that Kuhara Mining Co. Representative of Kuhara & Co. President of the Kyoho Life Insurance Co. Minister of Communications in Tanaka Cabinet, 1927-29. Elected to Lower House four times in Yamaguchi Prefecture. Assumed presidency of Seiyukai orthodox faction when Party split in May 1939. Member of Cabinet Advisory Council, December 1939, but resigned in June 1940. Advocated dissolution of political parties.

After the assassination of February 1936, he and General Masakai were detained as suspected chief accomplices, but both were cleared of complicity, chiefly because of their influence and high positions.